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In one-machine sequencing sitnations ca.ch agent (player) has one job that has to be
processed on a single machine Gacti joh is specified by its processing time, the time the
machine takes to handle the job. We assume that the cost of a player depend linearly
on the completion time of his job. Furthermore, there is an initial order on the jobs of
the agents before the processing of the machine starts.
Each group of agents (coalition) is allowed to obtain i:ost savings by rearranging
their jobs in a way t1raL is adniissiblc with respect to the initial order. By defining the
worth of a coalition as the maximmn cost savings a coalition can make by adrrrissible
rearrangements, we obtain a cooperative game called sequencing game, related to the one
machine sequencing situation. This game theoretic approach has been taken in Curiel,
Pederzoli and Tijs (l989~. They also defined thc EGS (equal gain splitting) rule on the
class of sequencing situations to obtain a division of the value of the grand coalition.
It has been shown that the ECS rvle is in the core of the corresponding sequencing
game. Clrriel, Potter's, !1(l~L1t(l1'!L Prasad, 'I'ijs and Veldnaan (1998~ considcrcd the class
oí component additive games a.nd introduced the A-rule as the average of two marginal
vectors. They showed that the class of sequencing games is contained in the class of
component additive games. Moreover, they showed that the Q-rule coincides with the
EGS rule in the class of sequencing games. Hence, the EGS rule can be regarded as an
alternative to the Shapley value. It takes the average of two marginal vectors, while the
Shapley valuc t,akes the average of all marginal vectors.
In this paper an alternative characterization for the EGS rule is presented. For this
purpose we introducc thc class 7-l of coalitions of the form {1,...,i} or {i -} 1,...,n}, 1 C
i C n- 1. The EGS rule will be characterized by efirciency and the fair head-tail split
property. A division rulc satisfies the fair head-tail property if the marginal benefits of
a union of each head and its complement is equally shared. Further, the set ?-[ yields a
generalized core. It is shown that this core is the convex hull of 2n-r vectors and that
the EGS rule is the average of these vectors. It is shown that the general nucleolus with
respect to ~(, as introduced by Mnschler, Potters and Tijs (1992), coincides with theEGS rule. Finally, necessary and sufficient conditions for the ECS rule to coincide with
the ntrcleolus are given.
2 Sequencing situations and the EGS rule
This sectiou describes sequencing situations and the corresponding sequencing games.
Further, we recall the definition of the EGS rule and some well known facts írom game
theory. For the EGS rule we givc a new characterizatiou by efficiency and the fair
head-tail split property.
In a one machine sequencing situa.tion therc is a queue of agents, each with one job,
to be processed by one mac:hine 7'he finite set of agents is denoted by N- {1,...,n}.
'1'he position of the agents in thc que~ue is described by a bijection Q: N--~ { 1, ..., n}.
Specifically, Q(i) - j ineans Lhat player i is in position j. We assume that there is an
initial order Qo : N--~ { 1, ..., n} on the jobs of the players before the processing of the
machine starts. We number the agents in such way that the initial queue cocresponds
with Qo is defined by ao(i) - i for all i E N. 'l'he processing time p; of the job of player i
is the time the machine takes to handle this job. Further, it is assumed that every agent
has an affine cost function c; :[0, oo) -r R defined by c;(t) - a;t f(j; with a; J 0, ~3; E R.
So c;(t) is the cost for agent í if he is t units oí time in the system.
A sequencing situation as described above is denoted by (N, p, a), where N-
{ }, ..., rt}, p - (pi)iEN and CY - (~Yi)iEN. "I'l1C VCCtOr ~ - (,ji)iEN ]s omitted In t11C dc-
scription of the sequencing situatiou siuce the fixed costs it represents are independent
of the positions of the players in the queue.
For player i E { 1, ..., n- 1} we define the following sets with respect to the initial
order vo. The head of player i is the seL { 1, 2, ..., i} and the tail of player i is the set
{i, i-I- 1, ..., n}. Note that the head ( tail) of player i contains the set of players that
precedes ( follows) i in the initial order ~o. The collection of coalitions consisting of all
heads and all tails is denoted by 7i.
If the processing order is given by Q: N -~ { 1, ..., ra} then the completion time of
player i is equal to C(a,i) :- ~;,,,t;t~„t;~ p;. The total costs of co(S) of a coalition S C N,t
is given by c~(-~~) :- ~iesai(~~(~, i)) -f ~:~;.
The (ma.ximal) cost, savings of a. coa,litions .S' depend on the set of admissible rear-
rangements of this coalition. ~1 bijection a: N-~ {1,...,n} is called admissible for S if
it sa.tisfies the following two conditions:
(i) '1'he cornpletion time of each agent outside the coalition S is equal to his completion
tirne in the initial order-. C'(va. i )- C(a, i.) for all i E N~S.
(ii) tlre players of S are not allowed to jump over players outside S:
{1,...,i}nN~S-{j~~(j)Ga(i)}nN~S foralliES.
'1'he set of admissible reaa~rangenrents for a coalitiou S is denoted by ~.5.
Before the cooperative sc:qttencing gamc is given, we recall some well known facts
concerning coopcrative ga.mes. !1 coo~~eralive garrae is a pair ( N,v) where N is a finitc
set of playc~rs and v is a rnappitig r~ : ZN -~ R with v(N) - 0 and where 2N is thc
collection of all subsets of N.
A game (N, v) is called supern,dditive if for all coalitions .S,T E 2N with S n T- ~l we
h ave
v(S u I') ~ v(S) -~ v(T)
Coopera:tivc ga.mc thcory focnsc~s on 'fair' and~or 'stablc' division rules for the worth
c~(.N) of thc~ Krancl coalil:ion. r1 rurr c,lc~nic~tit :r -(.ri);EN E RN is snch tJta.L no coalil,ion
has an incentive to split o(f, i.e. .
~ xi - v(N) and x(S) ) v(S) for all S E 2N.
iEN
where x(S) -~;Ey :r;. The core C(v) consists of all core elements. A game is called
balanced if its core is non-empt,y.
For the nucleolus of a game, introduced by Schnaeidler ( 1969J, we need the following
notation. Let. h' :- ( F~ )-~.E.ZN, wltcrc~ h~~ is thc~ cxccss functiou corresponding to T defincd
by FT(x) :- i~(S) -.r(5'). `l'Irc~ fuuction O : RZn -~ RZn is thc map that ordcrs Lhc
coordinates in a weakly decreasing order. Then thc nucleolus of a game ( N,v) is defincd
by
~(N,v) - {x E I(v) ~ O o h(x) ~~ O o f~(y) for all y E I(v)}
where I(v) :- {x ~ x(N) - v(N),x(i) ~ v(i.) for all i E N} is the imputation set of
(N,v).Given a sequencing situation (N, p, a) the worth of a coalition S of the corresponding
sequencing game(Curiel et al.(198.9)) is defined as the maximal cost savings the coalition
can achieve by means of an admissible rearrangement. Formally,
v(S) - max{~(aiC(QO, ~) -~ Qi) - ~(aiC(a, z) } Qi)} (1)
oEEs ;ES
iES
Curiel et al. (1993J showcd that ( ]) is equivalent to the following expression:
v(S) - ~9i;u{i.ifr....,i}(S)
i~;
llcre g;~ :- max{cY~p; - a;p;,0} represents the gain attainable for player i and j in casc
player i is directly in front of player j. ~l'he gamc zi{;,;fr,...,;} is thc simple game defined
by
n{i.ifr,...,;}(S) :-
1 if {~i, i -{- 1, ... , j} C.S'
0 otherivise
The Equal Gain Splitt,ing (LGS) rule in a. sequencing situation (N, p, a) is defined for
aIIiENby




Note that the optimal order of a queue can be obtained from the initial order by switching
neighbours only. In the EGS rule a player obtains half of the gains of all neighbour
switches he is actually involved in, to obtain the optimal order.
Example 1 Let N- { 1, 2, 3}, p-(2, 2, 1) and a- (4, 6, 5). Then g12 - 4, gz3 - 4 and
.9is - 6. rl'his implies that EG',S'i ( IV,P, a) - 2(4 ~- 6) - 5, CG~Sz(IV, p, a) - 2(4 -b 4) -
4, EG'S3(N, p, a) - 2(6 -~ 4) - 5. ~
Curiel et al. (198.9J showed that a scquencing game is superadditive (even convex) and
that the EGS rule is in the corc of the seyucucing gamc. Moreover, they provided
a. charactcriza.tion of t.hc I;G~ rnle liy using c~fkicicncy, cliimnry Irropcrt,y, cquivalcncc~
prupi~rtY ~tn~l ~witch prupcrty. `4r~~ will e;iv~, a.n ul,hcr cha.ra.ctt~rizat,iuii in tcrnis uf c~(Iicic~nc.Y
and thc fain c~ad-tail split prupcrl,y.
Definition 1 1et (N, v) be a sequencirag game. Then a vector ~ E Rn satisfies the Jaár
head-tail split properlg if
x(S) - ii(S) - x(,S`) - v(,S") - ~.~ti for all .S E rl
whe.re OS - v(N) - v(.5') - v(,~'`). rfi
Note that from the fair head-tail property it follows that the excesses FS(x) and FS~(x)
are equal for all ti E ~-l. Bc~fore tlu~ cha.ractcrization of the I;GS rule is given we recall t.he
definition of a rre conrponent additivr` game~ and of the ~3-rule, both introduced by Curie,l,
Potters, Itajendra Prasad, Tijs and VclíTnan (199~3J. A coalition S is called connected
with respcc~t to rrv if fur a.l i, j E.ti' and k E N, rre(i) C rr~(k) G rro(7) implic~s k E.S.
Let T be a coalition that is not connected. A coalition S is a component of 7' if S C 7',
S is connected and for every i E 7'`S,'l' U{i} is not connected. 't'he components of 7'
forrn a partitiou of 'I' which wc dcuotc~ by 7'`QO. A gamc ( N, v) is callc;d a rrv componcnt
addivitive games if it satisfics thc~ following three conditions:
(i) v(i) - 0 for all i E N.
(ii) (N, r~) is srrpcradclitivc,.
(iii) v(T) - ~sE~~`oo t'(S)
Let (N, v) be a Qo component additive game therr
~i;(v) - ~{v({1,...,i}) - n({1,...,i. - 1}) f v({i,...,n}) - v({i -3- 1,...,n})} (2)
Curiel el al. (199,~J showc~d that the class of sequencing games is contained in the class
of ao component additive games and that the ~ rule restricted to the class of sequencing
games coincides with the EGS r-ule. It is immediately clear that the Q-rule satisfies
efficiency and fair head-tail split property.
Theorem 1 Iel (N, v) be fhe seqrzrrzcing yanze corresporzding to lhe sequencing situation
(N,p,a). `I'herz I~C,ti'(N,tr,rt) i.. llre anir~ae rulr. tlzat salisfies efJiciency arzd llze Jair
head-tail split property.
PROOF: I{rom (2) and the fact that the ECS rule coiucides with the ~3-rule on the class
of sequencing games it follows that the EGS rule satisfies the two properties. Conversely,
assume that a vector x has both properties. Then it follows from the fair head-tail split
property that for k E N`{n}
x({1,..., k}) - v({1,..., k}) -:rr({I' ~ I,...,rz}) - v({k ~ 1,...,rz}) (3)
ancl
x({1,...,k - 1}) - v({1,...,k - I}) - :r({k,...,ra}) - v({k,...,n}) (4)
From (3) and (9) it follows by suhtracting that,
x({k}) - v({1,..., k}) f v({1,..., k- 1}) --x({k}) - v({k -F 1,..., n}) -Y v({k,...,,a})r
Ilence, a({k} ) -~ik(v) - GGS~.( N, p, a) for all !~ E N~{n}. hrorn the efGciency it follows
immediately that x({n}) - EGS„(N,p.a). O
3 The head tail core
In this section the head tail core is introduced. We characterize the extreme points of
this set and show that the T;GS rule is the average of these extreme points.
'1'hc hca.d ta.il com CN(r~) uf .r. sc,ciuc~ur~ing ga.ntc~ (N, rr) is dafined hy
C~N(i') -{:r E R" ~.r(N) - r~(N)..r(,ti') 1 n(S) fur all S E ~-l}. (5)
Obviously, we have that the corc C(v) of the game (N,v) is contained in the head tail
core Cx(v). Thc following examplc, shows tha1, I,he core of a game can be a strict subset
of the hcad tail core.
Example 2 Consider the sequencing sítuation of example l. Then the correspond-
ing sequencing game is given by v({1,2}) - v({2,3}) - 4, v({1,2,3}) - 14 and
v({1}) - v({2}) - v({3}) - r~({1,3}) - 0. An extreme point of C~(v) is the vec-








The dual game (N, v') of (N, v) is dcfiued by v'(S) - v(N) - v(S`) for all S C N. Note
that v(N) - v"(N) and that v(S) G v'(S) for all S by the superadditivity of (N,v).
Now (5) is equivalent to
~
C~(v) -{x E R" ~ v({I,...,i}) C~.cr; G v"({I,...,i}) for all i E N}
A-t
-{x E R" ~ x- L-t,y,v({I,...,~i}) C y; C v'({I,...,i}) for all i E N}i7
where L is the n x re non-singnlar lower triangular matrix with ones on and below the
diagonal, and zeros abovc thc dia.gonal. It, is ca.,y to sce that the linear map L gives a
1-1 correspondencc bctwcen CN a.nd thc~ set D dcfiued by
D:- {y E R'L ~ v({1,...,i}) C y; G v"({1,...,i.}) for all i E N}
Consequently, thcre is a I-1 rorrespondence betwcen the extrerne points of both sets.
Clearly, the extrerne points of D correspond to a system of n equations of the form
y; -a;, i- 1,...,rr. wherc a; E{v({1,...,i}),v'({1,...,i})} for all i E N
Let J C N. We put hJ - L-' (yJ ) whcrc y'~ is the extreme point of D corresponding to
the system of eyual,ions given by
yi -~ v({I,...,i}) i E N`J
v'({1,...,i}) i~ E J
Then E-{h'r ~ J C N} is thc act of cxt,rcurc t~uints of C~(~n). Conscqueutly, we ha.vc
Theorem 2 CN(v) - corav{h.J ~ Ir.J E G}.
where hJ corresponds lo IJLe 3012L1io7LR of the set, of equations
~k-] ~k - 2J'({}, ..., 2}) 8 E J
(6)
~k-1 ~k - v({1,...,2}) 2 E N~.J
The number of extreme points is 2~r1 where I-{i E N ~ v({1,...,i}) ~ v'({1,...,i})}.
Hence, in the generic case we have 2n-' different extreme points since v`(N) - v(N)
and consequently n ~ I.
The following theorcro shows tha.t, the averagc of the extreme points of the head tail
core generated by (6) is the I~~GS rule.
Theorem 3 Let (N, p, a) be a seyuencíng situation and (N, v) the corresponding se-
yaerzcittg qarne. Tlcrrr. IsC~,S'(N,1r,cY) - .i.~-, ~JCNlI.'r.
PROO1~ : Notc t.ha.t for all i E N a.nd a.ll .l C N wc havc y,r f,yN~'r - v( { I,..., i} )~-
v'({1,...,i}). Conscqucntly, for all J C N it follows that L(iaJ -f hN`J) - yJ -b yN`J -
ye ~ yN - L(!ee ~ hN). Since ha -I- hN - 2EGS(N, p, a) we have
21 r ~ hJ - 2,~ ~ (hJ ~- hN~J) - ~„2nEG'S(N,P,a) - GC,S(N,p,n).
JCN JCN
O9
4 The EGS rule and the general nucleolus
In Lhis scctiui~ il, is shuwu that thc I:(:S rulc h~wti sonre sirnilarity with thc nuclc,rolus in
case the set of coalitions is restricted to the set ~{. In particular, it is shown that the
general nucleolus, introduced by Maschlcr el al.(199~), coincides with the EGS rule.
The following example shows that the EGS rule is not necessarily equal to the nucle-
olus of a sequencing game.
Example 3 Let N- {1,2,3},p -(2,2,1) a.nd a- (4,6,5). Then v({1,2}) -
v({2,3}) - 4, v({I,'?,3}) - I,I and r~({1}) - v({'~}) - v({3}) - v({1,3}) - 0. '1'hc
nucleolus of the game is (43, 4 i, 43 ), whereas the LGS rule equals (5, 4, 5). 0
In Maschler et al.(199.~) a geueral nucleolus is defined on the class of truncated games,
an extension of the class of coopcrative games. A trunc.ated game with respect to the
coopcrative ga.nic ( N, v) ís a. yua.drnplcl, ( N, S, r~, I l), whcrc N is thc playcr sct, S is a suh-
set of 2r```{~l, N} called the set of permissiblc. coalitions, v: S-~ R is the characteristic
function and 11 a set of permissihle pre-imputations.
Let F:- (FT)TES , whcre FT are the excess functions defined by !-~(x) :- v(T)-x(T).
The function O: R~s~ ~ R~s~ is the map that orders the coordinates in a weakly
decreasing order. Then the general nucleolus of the trtmcated game ( N, S, v, II) is defined
by
N(N,S,v,II)-{xErl ~OoF(.r)~vUoF(y)forallyEII}.
If (N,p,a) is a sequencing situation and (N,v) the corresponding sequencing game,
we introduce the l,ruucated ga,nu~ ( N, 7-(, i~, I I) whc,re Ti(.ti') - v(,5 ) for a.ll ,S E ~-( ancl
II :- {:r E R" ~ :c(N) - v(N)}, thc~ I,rc~-iniputrt.tiou sct of (N, n). 'I'hc following thcx,rcin
states that t,he I;GS rule. is thc~ gencral nuclcolns of thc truncated gatne (N,~-l,v, II).
Theorem 4 Lel (N, ~-l, v, II) Ge lhe trtrrrcaled yaryne of the sequencirag gaTne (N, v) cor-
resporadiny ln (N,},,n). '17cerc 1;~~,4(N,7,,cY) coirccirles wi1hN(N,7-L,v,CI).
PltooF: I~irst it is showu that N(N,S,v, II) is a. non-empty set.
Let y E 1[`C~(v), thcn thcrc exists a.n ,S E ~-( such that y(S) G v(.S). Sincc for any
x E C~(v) it holds that :r.(T) ) v(Í') for all T E 7-l we have that O o F(x) ~~ n o!~'(y).
Hence, N(N, S, n, TI) - {a~ E C'~ ~ n o F(a~) ~r, O o('(,y) for all y E C~(v)}. Since C~(v)
is a compact set a.nd O o h' is a. cont.inuuus niap it follows Llcat N( N, S, v, I I)~(~.i O
Let x E 1V(N,S,t~, f[). Suppc~sc thcrc cxist,s a R~ E N and an E~ 0 such Lhat
w({1,...,,~}) - x({},....~'})] - ~,,({ti. ~ 1,...,rr}) -x({~ -~ },...,rr})~ ~ E
7'ake y E Cl such that 'yi -:r; for a.ll i E N`{~-, A- -~ 1}, yk - xk ~ E and y~;~t - xk~r - c.
Therr
v(T)-x(T)-v(T)-,y(7') forall7'E7-(~{{I,...,1~},{k~-1,...,n}},
v({i,...,~}) - x({I,...,~'}) - v({1....,~}) - y({i,...,~}) -~ E
and
v({k f 1,...,~t}) -:r({!,~ f I,...,rr}) -'u({k f I,...,rr}) - y({k ~ 1,...,n}) - c.
Hence, 0 o F(y) ~~ O o F(a'). '1'Iris is iu contradictiou with thc dcfinition of !V. ln a
simi}ar way we can show that there exists no k E N such that
w({1,...,~}) - x({1,...,~})~ -[v({~; f},...,n}) - x({~ f i,...,n})~ G o.
This implies that for all .S E x we ha.ve I',y(x) - Fs~(x). Then it follows from theorem
1 that x- EGS(N, p, a). ~
5 Final remarks
In section 2 we stated that the class of rro c,omponent additive games contains the class
of sequencing games and that the ,B-rule restricted on the class of sequencing games
coincidcs with the EGS ru}e. hr the proofs of the previous results of this paper we only
used the properties of a ao component additive game and the expression of the Q value.
This implies that all results cau be extended to the ~ rule with respect to vo component
additive games.
T'ina.lly, a necessa.ry a.nd sn(TïcirnL condit,ion on a. se~quc~ncing sitnation is givcn such
I,Ira.t I,hc, I?(~ti rnlc, a.nd Lhc' nn~'Ic~uliis uf Llrc' c'urr~spuncling sc~ctrn~n('ing ga.nu, c~uinc~idc~.
Theorem 5 L('I ( N, p, (, ) Gr' ,r .,r',~rrr"r,(-~rrg ..i~,(ari(,rr a'rr.d ( N,'rr) 11(' Ilr(' ('07'7'C.ti,l011(lYJtl) sf-
quencing garne. Theu GCS'(N, p, a) - r~(N,'v) ij and orcly ij
p-1 n p-t i
~ ~ 9ab G ~~flabjc~ralll GpGiGtz
a-rb-iti - a-tb-u
-
p-1 n i n
~~(!ab G ~~ rlab fii'r all I G p G i G te .
a-1ó-itl - a-Y6-i}I -li
PROOF: From Yotters and l~c-ijniersr. (199~J it follows that the nucleolus of a sequencing
game is the unique point x satisfying efTciency and siift(x) - s;~t;(~) for all i E N` {n}.
Here si~ is defined as follows
s;~(.r.) :- max{v(T) -:r(1') ~ i E T C N`{j}, T is connected} .
From this and thc fac-t, Lhat I,hc, ECS-rule is Lhe unique rule that satisfies efficiency and
the fair head-tail property, it, follows that, the nucleolus is equal to the allocation given
by the T:GS-rulc whcn for all i E N`{n} thc rnaximum in thc definition of s;;~~ is
achieved aL 'l' -{ 1...., i} aiirl the in~~xirnuin in Lhe definition of s;~~; is achieved at
T-{i ~ 1,...,ti} when we take~ a~ to be equal to the allocation given by the LGS-ru}e.
Since only connected coalitions have to be considered for these rnaxima we obtain the
following inequalities.
F{t....,i}(~) ~ 1'{p,....i}(~) for all 1 G p G i G tt
F{itt....,,,}(~) ? 1'{iti....,q}(a~) for all i. f 1 G q G ta.
where F is the excess function. This set of inequalities is equivalent to
F{t,....~}(~) ? F{P,...,i}(~) for a.ll 1 G p G i G n
F{P....,n}(~) ? F{p....,i}(:r.) for all I G p G i G re.
Since
i-i i l i-i i 1 ~ b-t
v({p,...,i}) - ~ ~ g„r, - ;~ ~ ~ gab f ;~ ~ ~gab
~-r~ b-R t i -- ~~~-~, b-aft " b-vt i a-P
and
(7)
1 i n 1 6-t
x({p,...,i})-.j~ ~ 9ab-~-~~yab
~ a-P6-a}1 2 6-pa-1
we have for any p, i E N, p G i that
P- P-
v({p,...,i}) - ~({p,...,i}) - -2(~ ~ gab f ~ 9ib ~- ~ ~.9ab -~ ~9aP)
a-P6-i}I b-itt 6-p-~1a-1 a-t
1 i n i P- t
- -2(~ ~ 9ab f ~ ~yab).
a-P 6-i-}1 ócp n-1
Define GIxJ -~aE1 G.bEJ ~Jab for ai~Y connected 1, J C N with gab - 0 if a~ b. Then
(7) is equivalent to
G{t,...,i}x{itt,...,n} C G{P,....i}x{itt.....,t} t G{i,...,p-t}x{p,...,i} for all 1 G p C i G n
G(t,...,P-t}x{p,...,n} C G{P,...,i}x{;ft....,n} f G{i,....P-1}x{p,...,i} for al! 1 G p G i G n.
These reduce to
G{t,...,P-t}x{itt....,n} C G{~,...,P-i}x{p,...,i} for all 1 G p G i G niZ
C~{~,...,r-i}x{~t~,...,~~} C~~{F.,...,~}x{tt~,...,~~} fur all 1 G p G i G ta.
which proves the if part.
In the only iC part we ha.vc tha.t I;C4( N, ~i, rr) - r~( N, v). The efficiency and thc head-tail
fairnc~ss in~~rlii~s tha.t t.hc~ n~a.xiimm~ in thi, ~Ic~liiiil,ion uf .ti;;fi is ac~hic~vr~d at, 7' -{1,...,i}
ancl thc rnaximuni in the de(inil.icni uf s;t~; is a.chicved at 'I' -{i f I,...,n}. l~rom Lhe if
part follows the result immediately. O1:3
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